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State Dept. review completed

ACIS - 1385/85  
12 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

--EYES ONLY--

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

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SUBJECT: Your Luncheon with Ambassador Kampelman (U)

1. This "fast-track" memorandum is for your information; it provides some background data on arms control issues which you may care to discuss with Ambassador Kampelman when you have lunch with him on Tuesday, 13 August. (OUO)

2. I have no topics which I specifically would like you to raise with Ambassador Kampelman. My perception is that this luncheon is an opportunity for the two of you to talk about where the world, arms control and other, is at the moment and where the two of you think it might go. As the paragraphs below make clear, however, there are a number of topics which you might care to touch upon in your discussion. Some of this material may be new to you; if so, this is simply because your luncheon came up before we were able to get this material to you. (OUO)

3. Current Support to the NST Negotiations:

[Redacted]

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You might find interesting reading Ambassador Kampelman's personal overview of NST Round II (Tab Q). (OUO)

[Redacted]

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5. NSDD-183:

This document (Tab R) sets out how the Executive Branch will be preparing the President for his November meeting. You might find it useful to point out that the arms control material will be strongly controlled by National Security Advisor McFarlane through the SACG. This arrangement ought to minimize "meddling". [redacted]

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6. The "Nightmare":

In Friday's meeting of the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG), Bud McFarlane talked about the need to think about a situation in which Soviet leader Gorbachev in November says "we will agree to the US position if you will agree to ours". Although there was no exposition during the SACG meeting of what this concept might mean, I think we have enough knowledge to hypothesize the outlines an example of the idea:

-- The USSR will reduce its number of strategic nuclear device vehicles by 30 (or even 40) percent; establish internal percentages of ICBMs versus bombers, etc.; and place an explicit limit on the nuclear devices themselves (i.e., warheads, bombs) and reduce that number as well.

-- BUT the US has to limit SDI and reaffirm the ABM Treaty.

Bud went on to say the President has to be ready with his position, should this scenario occur; he cannot go to Geneva and simply react on that date in an ad hoc manner. Ambassador Kampelman referred to this issue as "Carrington's nightmare" NOTE: Acceptance of Gorbachev's gambit likely will imply acceptance in some form of the SALT II Treaty. [redacted]

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7. Implications of Soviet Statements on Strategic Arms Reductions:


CIA recently completed a paper (Tab T), at Bud McFarlane's request, which addresses this issue. Bud's question was "what do Soviet statements mean to Soviet forces? The answer in this paper is that it depends on the numbers you are trying to get to, the internal percentages (ICBMs versus bombers), and the counting rules you use for fractionated ballistic missiles. [redacted]

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8. Expected Soviet Arms Control Moves:

A paper is underway in SOVA in response to a request from the NST delegation. This paper should be completed by late-August. It will, of course, be made available to you and Ambassador Kampelman. 

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The NIO/USSR paper on the Soviet game plan is included (Tab U).  
(OUO)

9. Without being indiscreet, if there is anything you consider appropriate to tell me about after your luncheon, I would appreciate hearing from you. (U)

10. If there is anything more I can do to assist you here, please call and let me know. (U)



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Attachments:



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Q. State Message entitled "NST: Overview of Round II"

R. NSDD-183 - Meeting with Soviet Leader in Geneva



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 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NST GENEVA 06819

EXDIS

FROM NST/KAMPELMAN

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD

MILITARY ADDRESS HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, INF, NST

SUBJECT: NST: OVERVIEW OF ROUND II

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. (THIS IS NST II-020).
2. BELOW IS MY PERSONAL EVALUATION OF THE SECOND ROUND OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.
3. ROUND II WAS DISAPPOINTING BUT NOT SURPRISING. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THE CONTINUATION OF A "HOSTAGE" SITUATION AMONG THE THREE AREAS OF NEGOTIATION. START WAS A DOUBLE HOSTAGE -- TO RESOLUTION OF INF AND TO A BAN ON SPACE RESEARCH. INF WAS A HOSTAGE TO SPACE. AND PROGRESS IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE GROUP WAS A HOSTAGE TO THE UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET DEMAND THAT SDI RESEARCH BE BANNED.
4. THERE WAS SOME CONTRAPUNTAL MOVEMENT IN SOVIET TACTICS IN START AND INF. IN INF THE MOVEMENT WAS BACKWARD: FROM THE ROUND I STATEMENT THAT AN INF AGREEMENT COULD BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED ON ITS OWN TO THE ROUND II INSISTENCE THAT INF MUST AWAIT THE RESOLUTION OF THE SDI ISSUE. IN START THE MOVEMENT SEEMED TO BE IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET FRAMEWORK IDEA IS CLOUDED WITH AMBIGUITIES -- AS AMBASSADOR TOWER HAS CALLED IT, AN UNKNOWN PERCENTAGE OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER.
5. EXCEPT IN INF, THE SOVIETS APPROACHED US WITH FEWER

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INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1658  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1645  
BT  
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 NST GENEVA 06819

EXDIS

FROM NST/KAMPELMAN

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD

MILITARY ADDRESS HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF, NST  
SUBJECT: NST: OVERVIEW OF ROUND II

FROM OUR ALLIES, OUR CONGRESS, AND OUR PUBLICS. AND THEY  
HAVE NOT STAMPEDED US AWAY FROM THE CALM AND FLEXIBLE  
APPROACH WITH WHICH WE ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MARCH.  
OUR WATCHWORDS THUS REMAIN PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE.

KAMPELMAN

END OF MESSAGE

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THE WHITE HOUSE

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

WASHINGTON

Executive Registry

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August 8, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: NSDD on Meeting With Soviet Leader in Geneva (S)

The President has approved the attached National Security  
Decision Directive on his planned meeting with the Soviet leader  
in Geneva. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment  
NSDD-183

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1985

*National Security Decision  
Directive Number 183*

## MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA (U)

As we prepare for my meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva November 19-20, it will be important for personnel of all agencies active in the sphere of U.S.-Soviet relations to understand clearly the context of the meeting and United States objectives. (U)

I invited the Soviet leader to a meeting as soon as he assumed his position, because I consider it important for the leaders of the two most powerful nations to know each other and to establish a dialogue which can assist us in managing a relationship which is inevitably adversarial but which must be conducted in a manner which improves stability in the world. (U)

Accordingly, the primary purpose of the meeting will be to establish personal contact and, if possible, to develop an agenda for negotiations to be undertaken in the future. The meeting will not be a substitute for negotiations in normal channels, nor is its aim the signing of formal agreements. It should rather be viewed as part of an ongoing process of dialogue with the Soviet leadership, which can give direction and momentum to our negotiating efforts. (U)

Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in various areas should continue to be conducted on their merits, and should neither be hastened nor delayed because of my upcoming meeting. While I do not preclude the possibility of signing or announcing possible agreements which may be reached during the intervening period in the normal course of negotiation, this is not the purpose of the meeting, and the planned meeting should under no circumstances be allowed to influence the United States negotiating position. (S)

Since historically public expectations for meetings between American and Soviet leaders have been inflated and have led to a damaging cycle of euphoria and then disillusionment, it will be important to convey to the public a realistic picture of the context in which my meeting will take place. In particular, nothing should be said to encourage the expectation that the meeting will result in a fundamental change in the nature of the

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U.S.-Soviet relationship, or in major agreements. This must be done, however, without denigrating the importance of the meeting or of kindling suspicions that the United States is not serious in its efforts to resolve problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. (S)

Given the importance of maintaining a clear and consistent treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations in our public statements and public diplomacy, it is imperative for all U.S. Government officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by my own statements and those approved by the State Department and the White House. No official is authorized to originate public statements regarding the Geneva meeting, or to provide comments in background briefings that go beyond statements made publicly by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks concerning U.S.-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by the White House or the Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem desirable, they may be undertaken only following the specific approval of the White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting. (C)

In this connection, I am compelled to note that our negotiating position continues to be undermined by unauthorized, and often inaccurate or distorted information provided to the public media by anonymous government officials. It will be particularly important in the months ahead to put a stop to this damaging practice, and I would remind every agency head that it is part of his executive responsibility to control access to sensitive information in a manner which insures its integrity from unauthorized disclosure. (S)

Issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union will continue to be staffed in the normal interagency process, culminating in the National Security Council or National Security Planning Group. Overall arrangements for the Geneva meeting, including its public diplomacy aspects, will be coordinated by my Chief of Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (U)

To insure that the various strands of U.S.-Soviet relations are properly coordinated for presentation to these cabinet-level bodies, I hereby establish a White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting, with the following mandate:

1. To monitor and ensure consistency of substantive preparations for the meeting in Geneva, except for those which come under the aegis of the Senior Arms Control Group. (S)

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2. To coordinate policy guidance for public handling of issues related to the meeting in Geneva. (S)

3. To provide guidance to the White House Advance Office and other units responsible for arrangements and logistics in respect to substantive implications of arrangements for the meeting. (S)

The White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting will operate under the Chairmanship of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock, and will include representatives designated by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, along with such other officials as my Chief of Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)

*Ronald Reagan*

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